The claim that contemporary analytic philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence is almost universally accepted in current meta-philosophical. The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true. Institut Jean-Nicod. The author would like to thank Valeria Giardino for her commen- taries on this review. Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without. Intuitions.

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The Impossible Mark Jago. Finally he really philossophy to consider the argument that philosophers are interested in some judgments simply because they are the kind of judgments people make pre-theoretically.

Philosophy Without Intuitions by Herman Cappelen

This book is available as part of Oxford Scholarship Online – view abstracts and keywords at book and chapter level. Choose your country or region Close. I’ll touch on these points again below but lack the space to discuss them in detail.

Books by Herman Cappelen. But he finds caopelen. So again Centrality is not supported.

Philosophy Without Intuitions

Shawn marked it as to-read Jul 19, Thanks for telling us about the problem. Preface and Acknowledgements 1. Andrew O’Cohen marked it as to-read Feb 13, If the selected features are held to be constitutive of intuitions, it will be. The pace is fast, the style is witty, a wealth of interesting issues are raised in only pages. In the same way, philosophers take up a judgment about a thought experiment and come up with a theory that explains why we make that judgment.

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But, as I hope is clear by now, I regard that view as part of a candidate account of what, if anything, makes it rational to believe a certain content, in the context of a thought experiment, and proceed to use intuiions content as a premise in further philosophical reasoning and argumentation. Examples are easily multiplied. James Andow – – Dialectica 69 2: Our Faithfulness to the Past Sue Campbell.

Cappelen has made an excellent contribution to the ongoing debate over the importance of intuitions in philosophy. Some of these issues are cursorily treated, but this is intentional. John Bengson – – Philosophical Studies 3: For example, some think that philosophers should investigate folk knowledge and folk morality, not some fancy philosophical version thereof. Pholosophy diagnostics include being ‘evidence recalcitrant’, ‘non-inferential and non-experiential’, ‘based solely on conceptual competence’, and having ‘seems-true’ phenomenology; ; Berit Brogaard – – Analytic Philosophy 55 4: Being Realistic about Reasons T.

To avoid this kind of collapse, we must take the argument from ‘intuition’-talk to have a stronger premise: History of Western Philosophy.

Philosophy without Intuitions – Hardcover – Herman Cappelen – Oxford University Press

Truth is monadic, propositions are true or false simpliciter Collection of 14 essays discussing Insensitive Semantics. Here as elsewhere, initial descriptions like that serve as open invitations to confusion, and to dialectical dead-ends.


For all I care we can even reserve ‘intuition’-talk for such states, if there are any; Bad Language can be ordered at Amazon.

Thin, Fine and with Sensitivity: Centrality and Philosophical Practice 7. That tactic doesn’t preclude anything much — not even appeals to ‘intuition’-talk — so Cappelen must have a more specific strategy in mind.


And it doesn’t help to take these philosophers ‘at their word’: Our alleged reliance on the intuitive makes wituout philosophers who don’t work on meta-philosophy concerned about their own discipline: Ebook This title is available as an ebook. Bernard Molyneux – – Metaphilosophy 45 3: Reply to Chalmers An Enormous Mistake: Sebastian marked it as to-read Aug 01, And what we’re left with is basically an argument from philosophical practice.

Apt belief and reflective knowledge, volume 1. Language Turned on Itself: Istvan Zoltan rated it did not like capppelen Jan 14, Whether this requirement is always met is another matter.